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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises out of a civil RICO action, 18
U.S.C.A. § 1951 et. seq. (1984), brought by plaintiff, Jaguar
Cars, Inc. ("Jaguar"), against Theodore Forhecz, Sr., and his
sons Theodore Forhecz, Jr. and Mark Forhecz, alleging that they
*

. Honorable Anita B. Brody, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

had perpetrated a scheme to systematically submit fraudulent
warranty claims to Jaguar through their jointly owned Jaguar
dealership, Royal Oaks Motor Car Company, Inc. ("Royal Oaks") in
violation of RICO sections 1962(c) and (d).

A jury awarded

Jaguar damages of $1.1 million against Theodore Forhecz, Sr.
("Theodore, Sr.") and $900,000 against Mark Forhecz ("Mark").1
In its final judgment, the district court molded the verdict to
reflect treble damages for the RICO violations, as required by 18
U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (1984).
Theodore, Sr. contends that the evidence was legally
insufficient to find him liable of the RICO predicate acts of
aiding and abetting mail fraud.

Additionally, Theodore, Sr. and

Mark ("the defendants") contend that Jaguar's RICO claims were
legally insufficient because Jaguar failed to establish
sufficient distinctiveness between the defendant "persons,"
allegedly liable for the RICO violations, and the "enterprise"
through which those persons acted.

This latter contention

requires us to reconsider our interpretation of the civil RICO
statute in light of evolving Supreme Court precedent.

More

particularly, we are faced with the question whether this court's
jurisprudence concerning the distinctiveness requirement of 18
U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) (1988), see Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d 702,
710 (3d Cir. 1991), survived the Supreme Court's opinions in

1

. Theodore Forhecz, Jr. was in charge of sales and reported to
his brother Mark. Theodore, Jr. was absolved of RICO violations
by the district court and is not a party to this appeal.

Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S.Ct. 1163 (1993) and National
Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S.Ct. 798 (1994).
Because we decide that this court's application of the
distinctiveness requirement of § 1962(c) to corporate officers
and directors does not survive Reves and Scheidler, and because
we are, therefore, satisfied that corporate officers/employees,
such as the defendants, may properly be held liable as persons
managing the affairs of their corporation as an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, we will affirm.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Theodore, Sr. was the 51% owner and president of the
Royal Oaks dealership.

The remaining 49% of the dealership was

owned by Mark and Theodore, Jr.

Mark was the general manager of

Royal Oaks and ran the day-to-day operations of the dealership.
In managing Royal Oaks, Mark reported to his father, who was the
president and majority shareholder.

Theodore, Sr. was actively

involved in the operation of the dealership, earning a salary of
roughly one-half million dollars a year for his services.
Theodore, Sr. spent between twenty-five and thirty hours a week
at Royal Oaks and met with Mark on a daily basis to discuss the
dealership's operations.
The trial record demonstrated that the Royal Oaks
dealership, through the actions of its employees, perpetrated a
widespread scheme from as early as 1987 through May 1991 to
defraud Jaguar through the submission of thousands of fraudulent
warranty claims.

Under this scheme, warranty claims were

continuously submitted to Jaguar for the cost of labor and parts

for alleged repairs that were either unnecessary, were never
actually performed, or were performed on cars that were no longer
under warranty.

The scheme included submitting fictitious time-

sheets, doctoring the warranty paperwork submitted to Jaguar, and
altering new parts to make them look old and in need of
replacement.

Additionally, an outside sublet paint-and-body

shop, Kolorworks, and its owner, Linda Kucharski, assisted the
defendants by helping them construct fraudulent warranty claims
for Royal Oaks to submit to Jaguar.
In total, Royal Oaks defrauded Jaguar in an amount of
between one and two million dollars,2 enabling Royal Oaks to
generate hundreds of thousands of dollars of warranty income per
month and to maintain extremely lucrative salaries for the
defendants through periods of declining sales income even though
its work bays were often empty and its technicians idle.
2

The

. The one to two million dollar estimate comes from testimony
that between 30% and 60% of the warranty repairs at the
dealership were fraudulent, combined with evidence that during
this period Jaguar paid a total of $3,487,080 to Royal Oaks for
warranty claims. We reject defendants' contention on appeal that
this evidence was too uncertain and speculative to support the
jury's verdict of $1.1 million against Theodore, Sr. and $900,000
against Mark. Jaguar's inability to give exact data on the fraud
was due to the defendants' secretive scheme in which the
paperwork for legitimate and fraudulent transactions was
identical. It is well settled that in such circumstances "the
jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based
on relevant data." Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S.
251, 264, 66 S.Ct. 574, 580 (1946); see also Danny Kresky
Enterprises Corp. v. Magid, 716 F.2d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 1983)
("[P]laintiffs must be free to select their own damage theories
as long as they are supported by a reasonable foundation.").
Given the evidence presented by Jaguar, we conclude that the jury
had a reasonable foundation on which to base its verdict.

evidence presented at trial demonstrated that actual work had
declined to a point where there were few, if any, cars in the
service department.
Correspondingly, in order to occupy their time, the
dealership's ten service technicians regularly sat at their
workbenches reading magazines, or congregated to pitch coins,
play ping-pong, softball, or operate electronic cars.
In October 1990, Jaguar began to suspect fraud at Royal
Oaks and, in an unprecedented move, sent a team of officials into
the dealership for an entire week to watch every repair being
made.

In order to avoid detection, the defendants placed a load

of new cars in the service areas for mock repairs, so that the
area looked full and technicians were kept busy while Jaguar's
representatives were at the dealership.

Such actions along with

other modifications and refinements to the fraudulent scheme
allowed the fraud to continue until May of 1991.
After discovering the fraud and terminating the
dealership in May of 1991, Jaguar brought suit in the District
Court for the District of New Jersey alleging violations of RICO
sections 1962(c) and (d).

Section 1962(d) prohibits conspiring

to violate sub-section (c).
1994).

18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(d) (West Supp.

Accordingly, the viability of Jaguar's section (d) claim

depends on the legal sufficiency of its § 1962(c) claim.
As noted above, the jury awarded damages against
Theodore, Sr. and Mark on Jaguar's RICO claims.

The district

court upheld the jury's award in response to the defendants'
post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law under Fed R.

Civ. Proc. 50(a) or for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59.
This appeal from the judgment and from the district court's order
denying the defendants' post-trial motions followed.
II.
The defendants contend that Jaguar's RICO claims were
legally insufficient in that Jaguar failed to allege a violation
of § 1962(c) by "persons" operating or managing a distinct
"enterprise."
plenary review.

Since this is a question of law, we exercise
See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d

1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).

Section 1962(c) provides, in relevant

part:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed
by or associated with any enterprise engaged
in,
or
the
activities
which
affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity. . . .
18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) (1984).
It is uncontested, on appeal, that Royal Oaks conducted
"a pattern of racketeering activity" which affected interstate
commerce.

Given that § 1962(c) requires conduct by a "person

employed by or associated with any enterprise," the issue is
whether Jaguar has alleged activity by both a person and an
enterprise.

"Person" includes "any individual or entity capable

of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
U.S.C.A. § 1961(3) (1984).
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"Enterprise" includes "any

individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal

entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."

18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (1984).
A.

This court first addressed § 1962(c)'s requirement to
plead persons distinct from an enterprise in Hirsch v. Enright
Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1984).

In Enright, a

jewelry manufacturer brought an action alleging fraudulent
misrepresentation and a corresponding violation of § 1962(c)
against a lone defendant -- a corporation engaged in metal
refining.

In Enright we concluded that the defendant corporation

could not be liable under § 1962(c) in that "the `person' subject
to liability cannot be the same entity as the `enterprise.'"
at 633.

Id.

Because the person charged with liability in Enright,

the corporate defendant, was "the same entity as the entity
fulfilling the enterprise requirement," we reversed the § 1962(c)
RICO judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Id. at 633.

In Enright we articulated two grounds in support of our
holding.

The first was a literal reading of the statute: "the

language contemplates that the `person' must be associated with a
separate `enterprise' before there can be RICO liability on the
part of the `person.'"

Id.

The second ground was a belief that

Congress intended to limit RICO's application to preventing the
infiltration of legitimate organizations by criminal and corrupt
organizations: "[i]t is in keeping with that Congressional scheme
to orient section 1962(c) toward punishing the infiltrating
criminals rather than the legitimate corporation which might be

an innocent victim of the racketeering activity in some
circumstances."

Id.

In Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275
(1985), the Supreme Court foreclosed Enright's second rationale.
Instead of being used against mobsters and
organized criminals, [RICO] has become a tool
for everyday fraud cases brought against
respected and legitimate enterprises.
Yet
Congress wanted to reach both legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises.
The former enjoy
neither an inherent incapacity for criminal
activity nor immunity from its consequences.
The
fact
that
[RICO]
is
used
against
respected businesses allegedly engaged in a
pattern of specifically identified criminal
conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for
assuming
that
the
provision
is
being
misconstrued. . . . The fact that RICO has
been applied in situations not expressly
anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate
ambiguity.
It demonstrates breadth.
It is
true that private civil actions under the
statute are being brought almost solely
against such defendants, rather than against
the archetypal, intimidating mobster.
Yet
this defect -- if defect it is -- is inherent
in the statute as written, and its correction
must lie with Congress.
Id. at 499, 105 S.Ct. at 3286 (citation, internal quotation marks
and footnote omitted).

Thus, the Court's holding in Sedima

undermined the second basis of the Enright holding.
This court, nonetheless, properly continued after
Sedima to apply a distinctiveness requirement, since Enright's
holding was also based on § 1962(c)'s textual directive to allege
conduct by defendant "persons" operating an "enterprise."

Thus,

Enright's basic holding that "the `person' subject to liability
cannot be the same entity as the `enterprise,'" Enright, 751 F.2d

at 633, plainly survived Sedima.

See Glessner, 952 F.2d at 710

("The requirement of distinctiveness stems from the statute
itself, and has been applied following Sedima.");

Brittingham v.

Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[T]he plain
language of the statute provides that the person must be
`employed by or associated with' -- and therefore separate from - the enterprise . . . .");

Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824

F.2d 1349, 1359 (3d Cir. 1987) ("We explained in Enright that
§ 1962(c) was drafted in such a way that Congress must have
intended the `person' and the `enterprise' to be distinct
entities under that provision.").
This court's post-Sedima jurisprudence, however, could
be described as following an oblique angle, which, with the
benefit of hindsight, appears unfortunate.

In defining the scope

of the distinctiveness requirement, our cases focused not on the
statutory rationale, but on a re-incarnation of the defunct
infiltrating racketeer rationale of Enright.

Since, under the

infiltrating racketeer rationale, legitimate corporations were
properly viewed as victims of the racketeering activity, we
reasoned that defendant persons needed to be associated with
another separate, illegitimate infiltrating enterprise.

In other

words, we concluded that a successful § 1962(c) claim could not
allege conduct on the part of corporate officers and directors
acting through a legitimate corporate enterprise.

This

limitation on actions under § 1962(c) was born of a pre-Sedima
"infiltrating racketeer" reading of RICO's legislative history,
which, as explained below, was clearly emasculated by the Supreme

Court in Reves and Scheidler.

Clear resolution of the issues

requires, however, that we briefly sketch our post-Sedima
jurisprudence.3
This jurisprudence began to diverge in Petro-Tech, Inc.
v. Western Co., 824 F.2d at 1359, where, relying on the
infiltrating racketeer legislative history cited in Enright, we
held that "§ 1962(c) was intended to govern only those instances
in which an `innocent' or `passive' corporation is victimized by
the RICO `persons,' and either drained of its own money or used
as a passive tool to extract money from third parties."

After

Petro-Tech, we continued to adhere to this limitation on
§ 1962(c) claims.
In Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d at 710-14, we considered
whether "the individual defendants who were officers and
employees of the corporation[] can be the `persons' who were
conducting a pattern of racketeering through the corporation[] as
an enterprise."

Id. at 713.

Glessner involved a suit by

defrauded customers against the defendants, William Kenney, and
the other officers of Meenan Oil Co. ("Meenan"), who allegedly
acted through the corporation to fraudulently market and sell
residential home heating systems.
3

Glessner upheld the district

. Although Reves and Scheidler did not explicitly address
§ 1962(c)'s distinctiveness requirement, we nevertheless
conclude, see infra part D, that these cases by implication
emasculated our distinctiveness jurisprudence. Given this
conclusion, we believe it is necessary to first discuss and
interpret this court's relevant post-Sedima jurisprudence in
order to effectively demonstrate how the analysis of Reves and
Scheidler implicitly overruled this court's interpretation of
§ 1962(c)'s distinctiveness requirement.

court's dismissal of plaintiffs' § 1962(c) claim for failure to
plead persons distinct from the corporate enterprise.

The

Glessner panel acknowledged that in certain instances officers
and employees could constitute persons conducting a pattern of
racketeering activity through a corporate enterprise (though it
did not expand upon this statement).

Glessner, 952 F.2d at 713.

Nevertheless, the panel dismissed the action on the authority of
the Petro-Tech limitation of § 1962(c) claims to "only those
instances in which an `innocent' or `passive' corporation is
victimized by the RICO `persons,' and either drained of its own
money or used as a passive tool to extract money from third
parties."

Glessner, 952 F.2d at 713.
In concluding that plaintiffs failed to overcome this

limitation, the Glessner panel stated:
[T]he plaintiffs' injuries for which suit was
brought arose out of their failure to obtain
the safe, state-of-the-art [home heating]
units for which they paid.
The individual
defendants were alleged to have participated
in the fraudulent advertising as agents of
the corporation.
The RICO case statement
alleges merely that "all of the defendants
held positions as officers and principals of
the corporate defendants, and received income
as such.
All of the defendants derived
income from each and every sale of the [home
heating]
products.
These
sales
were
generated by defendants' multiple mail fraud
violations which combined into a pattern of
racketeering."
This
activity
is
indistinguishable from that alleged as to the
corporations and is a far cry from the use by
individuals
of
an
innocent
passive
corporation contemplated by Petro-Tech.
We
conclude therefore that this is not the
situation in which individual defendants,
whether employees/officers or not, can be
viewed as distinct from the corporations

deemed the enterprise.
It follows that
dismissal of the section 1962(c) claim was
not erroneous.
Id. at 713-14 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the Glessner panel, relying in turn on Petro-Tech's
infiltrating racketeer limitation to § 1962(c) actions, dismissed
the plaintiffs' claim that the defendant persons conducted the
corporate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.
B.
Under this court's interpretation of § 1962(c), as
articulated in Glessner, Jaguar's RICO claims would fail unless
Royal Oaks was either (1) the victim of the defendant's scheme,
or (2) a passive tool through which the scheme was conducted.
Pointing to the Glessner panel's acknowledgement that officers
and employees of a corporate enterprise could in certain
instances be properly viewed as distinct defendant "persons"
under this test, Jaguar initially contends that this is such a
case and, accordingly, is distinguishable from Glessner.
We begin by observing that it seems inconceivable that
Royal Oaks could be viewed as the victim of the defendants'
racketeering activity, since Jaguar alleges that Royal Oaks is
the enterprise through which the defendants conducted their
racketeering activity.

Rather, Jaguar contends that its claim is

distinguishable from Glessner in that the defendants in this
action can be viewed as persons using Royal Oaks as a passive
tool to extract money from third parties.

In determining the scope of the "passive tool"
limitation, we begin by recognizing that in Glessner, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that the
defendant officers were using Meenan as a passive tool to extract
money from third parties.

The Glessner panel reached this

conclusion despite the fact that the plaintiffs had alleged that
the defendants had operated the Meenan corporation so as to
derive income from multiple mail fraud violations.

Bound by the

strictures of Petro-Tech, the Glessner panel reasoned that the
defendants' activities were "a far cry from the use by
individuals of an innocent passive corporation contemplated by
Petro-Tech."

Glessner, 952 F.2d at 714.

Given this conclusion,

and recognizing that the activity contemplated by Petro-Tech was
rooted in Enright's infiltrating racketeer approach, we conclude
that this court's current interpretation of § 1962(c) improperly
limits its application to those circumstances where infiltrating
racketeers have successfully positioned themselves as employees
and/or officers within an otherwise legitimate corporate
enterprise.
Our interpretation of this court's "passive instrument"
limitation is buttressed by the recognition that corporations are
by definition passive instruments, since they are artificially
created legal persons that can only act through their officers
and employees.

Thus, a test that examines whether a corporation

is "a passive tool to extract money from third parties" can be
useful in determining whether officers and employees are

sufficiently distinct from the corporation only if one adopts the
infiltrating-racketeer rationale.
In sum, we find Jaguar's contention that this case,
unlike Glessner, satisfies our case law's interpretation of
§ 1962(c)'s distinctiveness requirement unpersuasive.

In this

action, as in Glessner, the plaintiffs have alleged that the
defendant "persons" operated, as officers and employees, a
corporate "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering
activity.

Similarly, like Glessner, the defendants here are not

distinct, infiltrating racketeers operating a legitimate
corporate enterprise as an innocent passive tool; rather, they
are officers and employees actively managing the affairs of an
otherwise legitimate corporation through a pattern of
racketeering activity.
C.
Even though we conclude that this case is
indistinguishable from Glessner, we nevertheless hold that the
defendants here are liable under § 1962(c) as persons managing
the affairs of their corporation as an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity, since this court's application
of the distinctiveness requirement to shield corporate officers
and directors from § 1962(c) liability does not survive Reves,
113 S.Ct. at 1163 and Scheidler, 114 S.Ct at 798.
In Reves, the Supreme Court was faced with the question
whether § 1962(c) "persons" must participate in the "operation or
management" of the "enterprise" in order to be subject to
liability.

The case involved a § 1962(c) action against auditors

working for what was then the accounting firm of Arthur Young,
which was engaged in an audit of the Farmer's Cooperative of
Arkansas and Oklahoma ("the Co-op").

Reves, 113 S.Ct. at 1167.

In certifying the Co-op's annual financial statements on two
separate occasions, the auditors knowingly failed to reflect a
Co-op investment at fair market value.

Id. at 1167-68.

Such a

valuation would have resulted in the financial statements
properly reflecting the Co-op's insolvency.

Id.

Given this malfeasance, the Co-op's trustee in
bankruptcy brought state and federal securities fraud claims
along with a RICO claim under § 1962(c) on behalf of a certified
class of noteholders.

Id.

The trustee alleged that the auditors

were the "persons" who conducted or participated in a corporate
"enterprise" (the Co-op) through a pattern of racketeering
activity consisting of the Co-op's fraudulent sale of securities
with the aid of knowingly false financial statements.

While the

auditors were found liable to the noteholders for their
securities fraud claims,4 the Court faced the question whether
they were also liable under § 1962(c) (that is, whether the
auditors were persons conducting or participating in the conduct
of the Co-op's affairs, given that the Co-op was the alleged
"enterprise" under § 1962(c)).

4

Id. at 1169.

. The auditors federal security fraud liability had been upheld
by a previous Supreme Court opinion, addressing the question of
whether the Co-op's notes were securities within the meaning of
§ 3(a)(10) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 110 S.Ct. 945 (1990).

The Court held that liability under § 1962(c) is
limited to those who "participate in the operation or management
of the enterprise itself."

Id. at 1173.

Since the auditors were

independent and did not operate or manage the Co-op, the Court
ruled that they were not liable under § 1962(c).5

In so holding,

the Court undermined the use of § 1962(c) to hold liable
"`outsiders' who have no official position within the
enterprise."

Id.

Reading RICO's legislative history, the Court

stated that subsections (a) and (b) of § 1962 addressed
Congressional concern with the infiltration of legitimate
organization by racketeers, while in contrast "§ 1962(c) is
limited to persons `employed by or associated with' an
enterprise, suggesting a more limited reach than subsections (a)
5

. Commentators have observed that the plaintiffs in Reves could
possibly have satisfied the operation and management requirement
of § 1962(c) had they alleged the existence of another
enterprise.
In Reves the enterprise was the Co-op, but
this is not the only possibility.
Section
1962(4) defines enterprise as including any
"legal entity" . . . and "any union or group
of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity." . . . Thus, RICO's
enterprise requirement can be satisfied by "a
group of individuals associated in fact" even
though not a distinct "legal entity."
What
if plaintiff in Reves had alleged that an
association in fact consisting of Arthur
Young, Jack White [the Co-op's General
Manager], and the Co-op constituted the
racketeering enterprise, and that Arthur
Young
directed
the
affairs
of
this
"enterprise?"
See Daniel B. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Civil Rico after Reves: An
Economic Commentary, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 193-94 (footnote omitted).

and (b)."

Id.

(emphasis added); see also id. ("Of course,

`outsiders' may be liable under § 1962(c) if they are `associated
with' an enterprise and participate in the conduct of its affairs
-- that is participate in the operation or management of the
enterprise itself.").
In the wake of Reves, the Supreme Court reiterated its
interpretation of § 1962(c) in National Organization for Women v.
Scheidler, 114 S.Ct. at 798, which concluded that an economic
motive was not required for liability under § 1962(c).
holding, the Court stated:

In so

"By contrast [with subsections (a)

and (b)], the `enterprise' in subsection (c) connotes generally
the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering
activity is committed, rather than the victim of that activity."
Id. at 804.

In light of Reves and Scheidler, we must, as Jaguar

has requested, re-evaluate the liability under § 1962(c) of
officers and employees acting through a corporate enterprise.6
6

. We recognize that in Gasoline Sales v. Aero Oil Co., 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 30399 (3d Cir. November 1, 1994), this court
continued to apply Glessner's limitation on § 1962(c) actions
against officers and directors acting through a corporate
"enterprise." In Gasoline Sales, plaintiffs alleged, in part,
that Getty Petroleum Corp. ("Getty") and its wholly-owned
subsidiaries engaged in a widespread fraudulent scheme to defraud
retail gasoline stations. One of the plaintiff's claims in
Gasoline Sales was against Getty's corporate officers, alleging
that they operated and managed Getty as an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Relying on Glessner, the
Gasoline Sales panel upheld the dismissal of this claim,
We have held that corporate employees who
victimize their employer by draining it of
its own money or using it as a passive tool
to extract money from third parties are
proper section 1962(c) defendants. Glessner,
952 F.2d at 713. Where the employees merely

D.
Our case law heretofore has focused on the degree of
distinctiveness between the defendant persons and the enterprise.
As we have stated, this court has held that in order for
liability under § 1962(c) to attach, the corporate enterprise
must be either (1) a victim, or (2) a passive tool used to
extract money from third parties (as opposed to the enterprise
through which the fraudulent scheme was perpetrated).

But

the first of these two situations -- a corporate "enterprise" as
victim of the racketeering activity of the defendant "persons" -is in direct conflict with both Reves and Scheidler.
In these cases the Supreme Court held that the
"enterprise" in subsection (c) is properly viewed as the "vehicle
through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is
committed, rather than the victim of that activity."

Scheidler,

114 S.Ct. at 804; Reves, 113 S.Ct. at 1171 ("Congress
(..continued)
participate in the corporation's own fraud by
acting as corporate agents, however, the
employees may not be sued under section
1962(c). Id. at 713-14.
Id. at *7.
Notwithstanding this court's internal operating
procedures, see Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 (binding
subsequent panels by prior published panel decisions absent in
banc consideration), we conclude that the Gasoline Sales panel's
application of the Glessner limitation is also not conclusive
here because the Supreme Court's opinions in Reves and Scheidler
were not called to the panel's attention, and the opinion did not
either explicitly or implicitly decide the impact of those cases
on the issues raised in that appeal.

consistently referred to subsection (c) as prohibiting the
operation of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity and to subsections (a) and (b) as prohibiting the
acquisition of an enterprise.").

Consequently, a victim

corporation "drained of its own money" by pilfering officers and
employees could not reasonably be viewed as the enterprise
through which employee persons carried out their racketeering
activity.

Rather, in such an instance, the proper enterprise

would be the association of employees who are victimizing the
corporation, while the victim corporation would not be the
enterprise, but instead the § 1962(c) claimant.
The second of our case law's two situations -- the use
of a corporate enterprise by infiltrating racketeers as a passive
tool or instrument to extract money from third parties -- remains
a proper, but very limited, application of § 1962(c) under Reves.
See Fischel & Sykes, supra, at 191 ("Unless the outsid[er] . . .
is responsible for or in control of management decision making,
enabling it to `direct the enterprise's affairs,' there can be no
RICO liability" (quoting Reves, 113 S.Ct. at 1170)).
In Reves, the Court acknowledged that in certain rare
instances infiltrating "persons" distinct from the corporate
enterprise could satisfy the "operation or management test," if
they exerted sufficient control over the corporation's
activities.

"`[O]utsiders' may be liable under § 1962(c) if they

are `associated with' an enterprise and participate in the
conduct of its affairs -- that is, participate in the operation
or management of the enterprise itself."

Reves, 113 S.Ct. at

1173 ("An enterprise also might be `operated' or `managed' by
others [those not in upper management] `associated with' the
enterprise who exert control over it as, for example, by
bribery.").
While a § 1962(c) claim can exist against persons
distinct from the corporate enterprise, so long as they exert
sufficient control over the enterprise, the Court has made clear
that the provision's reach is not limited to such rare instances.
In Reves the Court examined, and decided, the question whether
the defendant auditors "participated in the management of the Coop."

Reves, 113 S.Ct. at 1173.

While the majority in Reves

found that the auditors had not acted in a management capacity in
their preparation of the Co-ops's financial statements, the
dissent argued that the auditors "crossed the line separating
`outside' auditors from `inside' financial managers."7
113 S.Ct. at 1178 (Souter dissenting).

Reves,

Implicit in the Court's

analysis then, was the recognition that "inside" managers are the
"persons" § 1962(c) was designed to reach.

Thus, Glessner's

limitation to "outside" defendants, who either victimize the
corporate enterprise or operate it as a passive tool, cannot
survive the Court's holding in Reves that "inside" managers are
properly liable under § 1962(c).

7

. We note that this court applied Reves in a similar context in
affirming the dismissal of a § 1962(c) RICO claim against
independent auditors, but without needing to consider its
implication on our distinctiveness requirement. See University
of Maryland v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1538-39
(3d Cir. 1993).

Finally, we note that, if we fail to overrule this
court's interpretation of § 1962(c), its combination with Reves
would hold liable only those persons who are sufficiently
connected to an enterprise so as to operate or manage it while
still remaining sufficiently distinct from the enterprise so as
to victimize or passively control it.

Congress could not have

intended such a razor thin zone of application.

See Sedima, 473

U.S. at 497-98, 105 S.Ct. at 3285 ("RICO is to be read broadly.
This is the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously
expansive language and overall approach but also of its express
admonition that RICO is to `be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes,' Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947."
(citation omitted)).

As we have stated, our distinctiveness

jurisprudence was born of the now defunct, pre-Sedima,
infiltrating racketeer reading of RICO's legislative history, and
is now even more clearly at odds with Supreme Court precedent as
demonstrated by Reves and Scheidler.

This court's interpretation

of § 1962(c)'s distinctiveness requirement must therefore be
brought in line with binding Supreme Court precedent.
E.
We are thus left with the question: what remains of the
statutorily-based distinctiveness requirement after Reves and
Scheidler?

As we have stated, this requirement originates in the

statute's textual directive that § 1962(c) liability requires
conduct by defendant "persons" acting through an "enterprise."
In this regard, we conclude that the essential holding of Enright
remains undisturbed -- a claim simply against one corporation as

both "person" and "enterprise" is not sufficient.

Instead, a

viable § 1962(c) action requires a claim against defendant
"persons" acting through a distinct "enterprise."

But, alleging

conduct by officers or employees who operate or manage a
corporate enterprise satisfies this requirement.

A corporation

is an entity legally distinct from its officers or employees,
which satisfies the "enterprise" definition of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1961(4).

This section provides that "`enterprise' includes any

individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal
entity."

18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (emphasis added).

Accordingly,

Jaguar has satisfied the distinctiveness requirement of
§ 1962(c).

Jaguar has not brought a claim against Royal Oaks,

but instead seeks recovery from the defendants, as persons
operating and managing the Royal Oaks enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity.
We recognize that this court has, at times, supported
its infiltrating-racketeer reading of subsection (c) by resort to
the notion that "[s]uch an interpretation avoids the absurd
result that a corporation may always be pled to be the enterprise
controlled by its employees or officers."
713.

Glessner, 952 F.2d at

Informed by the teaching of Reves and Scheidler, however,

we do not believe that allowing a § 1962(c) action against
officers conducting a pattern of racketeering activity through a
corporate enterprise yields an "absurd result."

In such an

action, the plaintiff can only recover against the defendant
officers and cannot recover against the corporation simply by
pleading the officers as the persons controlling the corporate

enterprise, since the corporate enterprise is not liable under
§ 1962(c) in this context.

Instead, a corporation would be

liable under § 1962(c), only if it engages in racketeering
activity as a "person" in another distinct "enterprise," since
only "persons" are liable for violating § 1962(c).

Petro-Tech,

824 F.2d at 1358.
This interpretation of the distinctiveness requirement
of § 1962(c), not only accords with binding Supreme Court
precedent, as described above, but also is supported by the
interpretation adopted by all other circuits that have addressed
the question.

In United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 398 (7th Cir.

1993), for example, the Seventh Circuit was faced with a set of
circumstances similar to those in this case.

There, criminal

RICO charges were brought under § 1962(c) against the officers
and controlling shareholders of Renoja, a corporation that
operated as a Wendy's franchise.

The defendants engaged in a

fraudulent scheme to defraud their franchisor, Wendy's
International ("Wendy's"), by misstating the amount of their
gross sales in order to avoid paying Wendy's the required royalty
percentage.

The court, focusing on whether the defendant persons

and the corporation were distinct legal entities, rejected the
defendants' claim that the government had failed to satisfy the
distinctiveness requirement of § 1962(c):
Robinson
was
charged
with
improperly
conducting Renoja's activities, not his own
activities. Robinson's claim that he and
Renoja are inseparable entities is meritless.
. . . Renoja was an incorporated business
that employed several hundred people and

filed separate income tax returns. Robinson
and Renoja were not the same entity.
Robinson, 8 F.3d at 407.
In reaching its conclusion, the Robinson panel relied
on an earlier opinion by then Judge Posner in McCullough v.
Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1985), which held that an
unincorporated sole proprietorship was a distinct enterprise from
its owner because it employed several individuals.

In

McCullough, Judge Posner had recognized that, if the sole
proprietor had incorporated his business, the corporation could
then properly be treated as an "enterprise" under § 1962(c) even
if it employed no one else.

Id. at 144 ("If [a] one-man band

incorporates, it gets some legal protections from the corporate
form, such as limited liability; and it is just this sort of
legal shield for illegal activity that RICO tries to pierce.").
This result followed from the conjunctive definition of
"enterprise" which includes both "legal entit[ies] and any . . .
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity."

18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (emphasis added).

Thus, Judge

Posner concluded, "[t]he only important thing is that it [the
enterprise] be either formally (as when there is incorporation)
or practically (as when there are other people besides the
proprietor working in the organization) separable from the
individual."
In accord with Robinson is Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp.,
978 F.2d 1529 (9th Cir. 1992), where the Ninth Circuit considered
a § 1962(c) claim by a former timber company employee against the

officers of his former incorporated employer.

The plaintiff

there alleged that the officers, acting through a corporate
enterprise, blacklisted him for giving unfavorable testimony to a
Congressional Subcommittee.

The district court dismissed the

action on the grounds that there was "no distinction between the
officers, agents and employees who operate the corporation and
the corporation itself."

Id. at 1534.

Addressing this argument,

the Ninth Circuit held that a corporation was by legal definition
an enterprise distinct from its officers or employees:
This decision makes it clear that the
inability of a corporation to operate except
through its officers is not an impediment to
section 1962(c) suits.
That fact poses a
problem only when the corporation is the
named defendant - when it is both the
"person" and the "enterprise." In this case,
however,
[plaintiff]
named
the
several
individual officers as defendants/persons,
and [the corporation] as the enterprise.
Therefore, he has satisfied this allegation
requirement.
Sever, 978 F.2d at 1534.

Also in accord are Davis v. Mutual Life

Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 367, 377-78 (6th Cir 1993), and Bennett v. Berg,
685 F.2d 1053, 1061 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc 710 F.2d 1361
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
In sum, we conclude that when officers and/or employees
operate and manage a legitimate corporation, and use it to
conduct, through interstate commerce, a pattern of racketeering
activity, those defendant persons are properly liable under
§ 1962(c).

III.

In addition to challenging the legal sufficiency of his
RICO violation based on the distinctiveness requirement,
Theodore, Sr. ("Theodore") contends that insufficient evidence
was presented at trial to support the jury's finding that he was
liable of the predicate acts of mail fraud.8

The district court

considered this contention and concluded "that a reasonable jury
could readily have found liability on the RICO . . .

claims,"

because "[t]here was sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove
Theodore's knowing involvement in the fraudulent management of
the Royal Oaks service Department."

Mem. Op. at 3-4.

In reviewing an order denying or granting a judgment as
a matter of law, we exercise plenary review, applying the same
standard as the district court.

Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1166.

That standard permits such a motion to be granted "only if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and, giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable
inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury
reasonably could find liability."

Id.

In making such a

determination, "the court may not weigh the evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its version of the
facts for the jury's version."

Id.

While a "scintilla of

evidence is not enough to sustain a verdict of liability," the

8

. Since Jaguar elected to recover against the defendants based
on the RICO claims and because we conclude that Theodore was
properly found liable for the RICO violations, we do not reach
his contention that the jury's assessment of liability against
him for negligently overseeing the dealership and for unjust
enrichment was legally insufficient.

question is "whether there is evidence upon which the jury could
properly find a verdict for that party."

Id.

It is

uncontroverted that Mark and other dealership employees committed
numerous acts of mail fraud by systematically mailing false and
fraudulent warranty claims to Jaguar.

At issue on appeal is

whether the evidence presented to the jury supports the
conclusion that Theodore aided and abetted these predicate acts.
We have held that a defendant may be liable under RICO
if he aided or abetted the commission of at least two predicate
acts of mail fraud.

See Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d

Cir. 1990); Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1356.

Civil RICO liability

for aiding and abetting advances RICO's goal of permitting
recovery from anyone who has committed the predicate offenses,
"regardless of how he committed them."
1357.

Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at

In order to find a defendant liable for aiding and

abetting a predicate act under RICO, the plaintiff must prove (1)
that the substantive act has been committed, and (2) that the
defendant alleged to have aided and abetted the act knew of the
commission of the act and acted with intent to facilitate it.
Local 560, 780 F.2d at 284.
been met in this case.

The first element has concededly

With regard to the second, a plaintiff

need not offer direct evidence of intent.

Rather, the fact

finder may infer a defendant's knowledge and intent from
circumstantial evidence.

See Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp.,

937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Local 560, 780 F.2d
267, 284 ("[I]t has long been settled that it is permissible to
infer from circumstantial evidence the existence of intent.").

We must therefore consider whether, giving Jaguar the
advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is
sufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find that
Theodore knew of the fraud and acted with the intent to
facilitate it.

We recognize, as Jaguar concedes, that no single

piece of evidence links Theodore directly to the fraud.

Rather,

Jaguar contends that while Mark directed the fraudulent scheme,
Theodore's experience and active participation in the Royal Oaks
dealership, combined with the extent of the fraud, present a
sufficient basis from which a reasonable jury could have
concluded that he was aware of and facilitated the fraudulent
scheme.

We agree.
Theodore was the 51% owner and active president of the

Royal Oaks Jaguar dealership.

While Theodore had been a car

dealer since 1956, his son Mark had relatively little experience
in operating a dealership.
operation of Royal Oaks.

Theodore was actively involved in the
He spent roughly twenty-five to thirty

hours a week at the dealership and had ultimate supervisory
responsibility for the dealership's operations.

Theodore was

Mark's supervisor, and met with him daily to discuss the
operation of the dealership, including its parts and service
department.

In order to have exculpated Theodore, the jury would

had to have believed that in those meetings they never discussed,
in any depth, the operation of the service department and the
source of that department's income; even though, during this
period, the service department was accounting for between
$200,000 and $400,000 of the dealership's monthly income, thereby

allowing Theodore to maintain his annual salary of one-half
million dollars.
In our view, the evidence supports the conclusion that
Theodore was aware of and concerned about all of the operations
of the dealership.

His salary was five times the amount of any

other employee, including Mark.

Theodore acknowledged in his

testimony that he reviewed the dealership's financial statements
on a monthly basis and spent "a lot" of time "inspecting and
looking around the building."
Royal Oaks generated hundreds of thousands of dollars a
month in warranty claims, while actual work had declined to a
point where there were few, if any cars in the service
department.

The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that

the dealership's ten service technicians, in order to occupy
their time, regularly sat at their workbenches reading magazines,
or congregated to pitch coins, play ping-pong, play softball, or
operate electronic cars.

Similarly, some technicians themselves

asked to be laid off because they didn't believe that there was
enough work to keep them busy.

In a dealership which employed a

total of roughly thirty-five people, a jury could reasonably have
found it likely that Theodore was aware of a fraudulent scheme so
pervasive that the evidence suggested it was the subject of
innumerable jokes among Royal Oaks' employees.
The jury could also reasonably have concluded that an
experienced dealer, such as Theodore, would have grown suspicious
of the excessive amount of service income attributable to
warranty work, when examining the dealership's financial

statements.

Because of the pervasive warranty fraud, Royal Oaks

had an unusually high percentage of service department income
attributable to warranty work, as opposed to customer-paid
repairs.

Given Theodore's monthly scrutiny of the dealership's

financial statements, the jury could have concluded he was aware
of and facilitated the source of this aberrant financial data.
In addition, Theodore was aware of Jaguar's
unprecedented week long monitoring of Royal Oaks' service
department, and in response called Jaguar regarding it.

The jury

could reasonably have found it inconceivable that Theodore was
not aware of and did not facilitate the rampant fraud which both
preceded and followed Jaguar's investigation.
In sum, we conclude that the evidence of Theodore's
control over the dealership (including his spending significant
time there, reviewing the financial statements, and discussing
the dealership's operations on a daily basis with his son, the
architect of the fraudulent scheme), combined with evidence of
the pervasive nature of the fraudulent scheme, allowed the jury
to reasonably find Theodore liable of aiding and abetting the
predicate acts of mail fraud.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court and its order denying the defendants' post-trial motions
will be affirmed.9
9

. We have considered and rejected, either on the merits or as
not relevant, all the remaining arguments raised in the
defendants' brief. Specifically, we note our rejection of the
defendants' contention that the district court abused its
discretion by refusing to delay the trial in order to permit the
testimony of an expert witness not listed in the pretrial order.

(..continued)
The witness was supposed to testify that Royal Oaks' customers
were satisfied with the service provided by the dealership. This
testimony is irrelevant to the allegation that Royal Oaks
submitted false warranty claims to Jaguar, and hence we agree
with the district court's ruling.

